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Abstract Personal wealth has grown since the 1970s twice as fast in real terms as national
income. Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the
wealth being passed on from one generation to the next? Are we returning to the levels of
inheritance found in the 19th century? The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence
on the extent of the transmission of wealth in the form of estates and gifts inter vivos. It
takes a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate Duty was
introduced, and exploits the extensive estate data published over the years. Construction
of a long-run time series for more than a century is challenging, and there are important
limitations. The resulting time-series demonstrates the major importance of inheritance in
the UK before the First World War, when the total transmitted wealth represented some 20
per cent of net national income. In the inter-war period, the total was around 15 per cent,
falling to some 10 per cent after the Second World War, and then falling further to below 5
per cent in the late 1970s. Since then, there has indeed been an upturn: a rise from 4.8 per
cent in 1977 to 8.2 per cent in 2006. This increase was more or less in line with the increase
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in personal wealth, and has to be interpreted in the light of the changing net worth of the
corporate and public sectors of the economy.
Keywords Wealth · Inheritance · Estate data
1 Introduction
There has been a large rise in the ratio of personal wealth to national income. In the United
Kingdom, at the end of the 1970s the ratio of personal net worth, excluding pension rights,
to net national income was under 3; today it is over 5. Personal wealth grew over this period
faster than national income at a rate of some 2 per cent per annum—about twice as fast
in real terms. The rise in the wealth-income ratio is one reason that the rise in top income
shares has not led to the same rise in top wealth shares: the denominator has been rising
as well as the numerator. Between 1979 and 2005, the share of the top 1 per cent in total
income more than doubled, but the share of the top 1 per cent in total personal wealth rose
by less than 1 percentage point (Atkinson 2007; Alvaredo et al. 2018).
Has this rise in the wealth-income ratio led to a corresponding increase in the wealth
being passed on from one generation to the next? To the extent that the same assets
(such as houses and businesses) are owned, but there has been a rise in their relative
price, we may expect inheritance to rise in line. On the other hand, the rise in the sig-
nificance of personal wealth may result from increased life-cycle savings. The rise in
the wealth-income ratio may just be a reflection of the fact that people are expecting to
spend longer in retirement. The simplest life-cycle model, with the rate of growth equal
to the rate of interest, suggests that the wealth- income ratio rises by 0.5 for each extra
year of expected retirement (Modigliani (1986), page 301). In that case, no more may
be passed on in inheritance. But if we allow for the existence of state and private pen-
sion schemes (the figures quoted above exclude pension wealth), then 0.5 has to be scaled
down by (approximately) a factor of (1—replacement rate). Moreover, as shown by Piketty
(2009), the rise in the ratio is less marked when the rate of interest exceeds the rate of
growth. The sensitivity of the calculations regarding the wealth-income ratio does indeed
suggest that we cannot rely solely on simulations and have to consider the empirical
evidence.
The focus of this paper is on the empirical importance of inheritance in the UK. Has
the rise in the personal wealth-income ratio been accompanied by a rise in bequests? The
immediate motivation comes from the pioneering study for France by Piketty (2011), which
shows that inheritance has returned after a period of decline. In France, the annual wealth
transmitted fell from some 20 to 25 per cent of national income between 1820 and 1910
to around 2.5 per cent in 1950, but has since risen to around 15 per cent in 2010. In his
paper, he comments that “unfortunately there does not seem to exist any other country with
estate tax data that is as long term and as comprehensive as the French data” Piketty (2011,
page 1077). This paper takes up this challenge. As far as the UK is concerned, he is correct:
the data are less adequate. The data employed here start only in 1896, and they are less
complete with regard to gifts. But they can be used. Indeed, Karagiannaki has investigated
the evolution of inheritance in the UK over the period 1984 to 2005, finding that in this
period “the annual flow of inheritance increased markedly” (2011, page iii).
The aim of this paper is to construct UK evidence on the extent of the transmission of
wealth in the form of estates and, insofar as it is possible, gifts inter vivos. It follows Piketty
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(2011) in taking a long-run view of inheritance, starting from 1896, when the modern Estate
Duty was introduced by Harcourt in the 1894 Finance Act. Piketty (2009, 2011) uses two
approaches to the measurement of inheritance. The first is a direct measure of the flows of
bequests and gifts using the rich fiscal data in France; the second is an indirect measure
built up from mortality and wealth ownership data (this method in effect inverts the standard
estate multiplier method of estimating the wealth of the living—see Atkinson and Harrison
(1978)). This paper is based on the first method, exploiting the extensive estate data pub-
lished over the years in the UK. (The second approach is used in making certain corrections
to the estate-based estimates.) The sources and methods are described in Section 3. Con-
struction of a long-run time series for more than a century is indeed challenging, and it is
important to understand the limitations of the resulting estimates. The findings are set out in
Section 4. One of the aims of the research is to compare the findings with those of Piketty
for France, and this is the subject of Section 5. The comparison is of interest both on account
of the similarities of the two countries and on account of the differences, notably in the case
of England and Wales concerning the freedom of bequest, which differentiates these parts
of Great Britain from France (and Scotland). As Josiah Wedgwood remarked, “few English-
men realise how great is the difference between the European laws of succession and their
own” (1929, 1939, page 91).
Before embarking on the estimation of the extent of inherited wealth, I begin in Section 2
by seeking to set the UK rise in the wealth-income ratio within the context of changes in
asset prices and changes in the net worth of other sectors of the UK economy.
2 Background: The recent rise in personal wealth
The evolution of the ratio of personal wealth to net national income in the UK since 1920 is
presented in Fig. 1. This shows the increase that has taken place in the past 30 years. If this
rise in the wealth-income ratio were the result of purely demographic developments, then
we should expect it to have happened gradually over the post-war period. Life expectancy
at age 65 has increased steadily. The average effective age of retirement for men in the UK
fell more between 1950 and 1980 than between 1980 and 1995, whereas the wealth-income
ratio fell from around 4 in 1950 to under 3 in 1980.
The U-shaped pattern since 1950 must reflect other factors. One obvious hypothesis is
suggested by the timing of the turning point, which coincided with the election in 1979 of a
Conservative Government led byMrs Thatcher. Policies changed in directions that impacted
directly on household wealth, most evidently the commencement of privatisation, which led
to the sale of state owned assets, including shares in nationalised industries and state-owned
housing (through the “Right to Buy” sale of council houses). I begin with housing, since
one natural reaction to Fig. 1 is to say that “it is all to do with rising house prices.”
Owner-occupation in the UK increased rapidly over the post-war period: in England and
Wales, from 31 per cent in 1951 to 58 per cent in 1981 (Holmans 2000, Table 14.12). Insofar
as this was accompanied by a fall in private landlords, there was no change in the sector of
ownership. Indeed, total personal ownership of houses fell from 82 per cent in 1951 to 69
per cent in 1981. There was an increase in state-owned housing. This was reversed following
1979 by the sale of council houses, which meant that the total personal ownership of houses
rose to 77 per cent in 1991. This explains part of the U shape. The upswing was re-inforced
by the relative rise in housing prices that took place in the later part of the period. In 1970
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Fig. 1 Personal wealth in the United Kingdom from 1920 to 2010 as ratio to net national income
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Fig. 2 Housing net worth in the United Kingdom from 1975 to 2010 as ratio to net national income
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UK house prices were no higher relative to consumer prices than in 1948, but between 1970
and 2009 house prices doubled in real terms.
There were therefore two forces at work over the post-war period: a fall and then a rise in
the proportion of the housing stock owned by persons, and a rise in relative house prices in
the second part of the period. Both of these factors combined to raise the personal wealth-
national income ratio in the later part of the period. As may be seen from Fig. 2, housing net
wealth (taken from the national balance sheets, subtracting the mortgage and other housing-
related debt) made a sizeable contribution. It accounted for a third of the overall rise in
the personal wealth-income ratio. As has been emphasised by Karagiannaki (2011a), the
change in personal wealth between 1995 and 2005 was almost entirely due to housing. But,
over the longer run, housing is not the whole story as far as the personal sector is concerned.
Comparing the two graphs, drawn with the same vertical scale, it may be seen that housing
accounts for about half of the increase since the 1970s.
In seeking to understand the other factors in operation, it is instructive to look at total
national wealth, again expressed as a ratio to net national income—see Fig. 3. The ratio
rose in the first part of the period but then stabilised. From 1957 to 1979 the ratio went
from under 4 to over 6. But in 2010 it was at much the same level as in 1979. If housing
is deducted, then the ratio fell steadily from 1979. The recent rise in the personal wealth-
income ratio must therefore have come at the expense of falling net worth of other sectors.
In the same way, the rise in national wealth before 1979 must have been associated with a
rise in the net worth of other sectors, since the personal wealth-income ratio was falling.
Figure 4 shows the net worth position of the corporate and public sectors. The corporate
sector includes private non-financial corporations and financial corporations. In his study
The wealth of the nation, Revell (1967) drew attention to the fact that the value of company
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Fig. 3 National wealth in the United Kingdom from 1957 to 2010, including and excluding housing wealth,
as ratio to net national income
142 A. B. Atkinson
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Public sector
Company sector
Ra
o
 to
 n
et
 n
a
on
al
 in
co
m
e
Fig. 4 Net worth of the public sector and the company sector in the United Kingdom from 1957 to 2010, as
ratio to net national income
shares on the stock market fell considerably short—at that time—of the value placed on
the company assets, net of liabilities. Treating the company shares as liabilities, the sector
had positive net worth. Or, the ratio of market capitalisation to the value of assets was less
than 1 (later, this ratio became known as Tobin’s q). As discussed by Piketty (2009, Data
Appendix, Part I, pages 33–36), the implications of the recorded positive net worth depend
on its source. In the case of the US, it has been suggested by Wright (2004) that there has
been a systematic over-valuation of company assets, as a result of the use of a perpetual
inventory method. On the other hand, to the extent that the difference represents a sustained
departure of asset prices from their underlying value, then we may need to take them into
account. Long ago, Clay pointed out to the “concealed assets of Joint Stock Companies
which are not fully represented in the Stock Exchange quotations of their stock” and went
on to say that “these should be added, probably in the main, to the estimated amount of the
capital in the hands of persons in the higher ranges of fortunes” (1925, page 80). As may
be seen from Fig. 4, the net worth of the company sector went from substantially positive at
the end of the 1970s to substantially negative at the turn of the century, where “substantial”
means of the order of magnitude of total net national income. It has since returned close to
zero, following, inversely, the ups and downs of the stock market. Expressed as a percentage
of net national income, the fall from 1979 to 2010 was some 1.2, or around half the increase
in the personal wealth-income ratio over that period.
The other important component is the balance sheet of the public sector. Net worth (not
taking account of pension liabilities) is shown in Fig. 4. During the period before 1979, the
public sector moved from a position where the national debt exceeded the value of assets
by an amount of around half national income to a positive position, with a wealth-national
income ratio of 1.3. In the next 30 years, the net worth of the state declined back to zero. In
effect, the state transferred title in much of its real assets to individual households: the state
Wealth and inheritance in Britain from 1896 to the present 143
net worth fell by an amount equal to some half of the increase in the personal wealth-income
ratio over this period.
To sum up, the rise in national wealth in the first part of the post-war period was asso-
ciated with increased net worth in the corporate and public sectors; in the second half of
the period, these gains were, at least in part, transferred to the personal sector. Both corpo-
rate and public net worth were transferred to future generations, but the inheritance takes
a different form—with different distributional consequences—now that the wealth is in the
hands of the personal sector.
3 Inheritance in the UK: Sources and methods
Economic advantage is passed on from generation to generation in several ways, of which
the most important is probably human capital. Here we are concerned with the transmission
of material wealth such as real property, cash, financial assets, and company shares. Trans-
fers may be made at death in the form of estates, or made as gifts inter vivos. Our aim is
to measure the annual total of such transfers. The flows are gross flows, that is, we do not
treat gifts given (or estates left) as negative entries. Where, for example, a person receives
an inheritance of X from a parent and immediately transfers this to a child as a gift inter
vivos, this counts as a total transfer of 2X.
Our concern is with the aggregate of transfers, not their distribution. It is quite possi-
ble that estates are left, not to children, but to more distant relatives or indeed persons not
related. A small but significant amount is left to charities (Atkinson et al. 2017). All of these
transfers are counted here as inter-generational transfers. At the same time, transfers do not
necessarily go from generation t to generation t+1. Wealth can be transferred sideways to
another member of the same generation or could skip a generation. The latter would cause
the extent of wealth transfers to be under-stated. An investigation into estates arising from
deaths in the UK in 2000/01 (reported on HMRC - Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
- website, Table 12.9) suggested however that grandchildren received a relatively small
proportion of the bequests by value: 3.6 per cent (of the total excluding transfers to charities).
The most common “sideways” transfer is from husband to wife or vice versa. Ideally,
we should like to exclude such within-generation transfers (including those from brother
to sister or cousin), but this is not always possible, and to this extent the degree of inter-
generational transfer is over-stated. The investigation into estates arising from deaths in the
UK in 2000/01 showed that a large part of the estates left by married men (82.0 per cent)
and married women (72.2 per cent) was left to the spouse (in these calculations, charitable
transfers have again been omitted).1 These inter-spousal transfers accounted for 17.9 per
cent of the value of transfers in that year. This is rather higher than the 10 per cent reported
for France by Piketty (2011, footnote 36). The percentage passing to children was 49.2 per
cent, which is quite a lot lower than the 70 per cent reported for France. In the UK, “other
relatives” received 19.0 per cent, and “strangers in blood” 10.3 per cent. The estimates
of Karagiannaki (2011a, Tables 1 and 2) give higher figures for inter-spousal transfers,
1 A small-scale study carried out in 1981 produced similar results (Inland Revenue Statistics 1984, Table 4.7).
Of the estates left by married men, 83 per cent by value (before duty but after subtracting charitable bequests)
was left to the spouse, and 74.5 per cent for married women. Overall, men left 32.4 per cent, and women 42.8
per cent, to children or grandchildren.
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averaging 30 per cent over the period 2002–2005, which she finds compares well with the
survey reports of inheritances.
3.1 Estate statistics
The transfer of wealth at death has long been the subject of taxation. Our period opens with
the enactment of the modern Estate Duty (ED) in the 1894 Harcourt Budget that unified
death duties on personal and real property. Estate Duty was replaced by Capital Transfer
Tax (CTT) in 1975, and that in turn was replaced by Inheritance Tax (IHT) in 1986. The
information used here comes from the published administrative data for these three taxes
covering years since 1896 to 2008. Up to 1973, the data cover Great Britain (i.e. England,
Wales and Scotland), thus avoiding any discontinuity when the (now) Republic of Ireland
left the United Kingdom in 1921.2 The sources are shown in Table 1. It should be noted
that the period covered is much shorter than that for France—113 years, compared with 183
years—but that there are fewer missing observations: 13, compared with 49. In particular,
the regular collection of estate data stopped in France in 1964, and the information used
by Piketty (2011) for subsequent years comes from samples of the tax returns taken for the
years 1977, 1984, 1987, 1994, 2000 and 2006. The last 45 years are better covered in the UK.
The “raw” estate information has to be corrected:
• to take into account estates below the tax threshold (“non-filers”);
• for under-valuation or exemption of certain classes of assets;
• to take into account wealth transferred before death: gifts inter vivos.
The addition of the wealth transferred by non-filers is of minor importance (although it
smoothes out the abrupt change when there is a large increase in the tax threshold in 1946),
but the other two elements are potentially larger.
The three elements are discussed in turn. Considerable use is made of the adjustments
applied in studies of the distribution of wealth amongst the living. At the same time, it
should be noted that not all these adjustments are relevant, given that our focus here is on
the transmission of wealth between generations. For example, these studies adjust by adding
back amounts paid in funeral expenses (Atkinson and Harrison 1978, page 299), but these
are genuine deductions from the amount transmitted and so no such correction is made here.
In the same way, adjustments are made for joint property, such as a house, passing on the
death of one spouse to the other. Since we would like in principle to exclude such sideways
transfers, no such adjustment is made here when calculating transmitted wealth.
3.2 Non-filers
The estate returns today in the UK cover some 45–50 per cent of the number of deaths of
persons aged 20 and over—see Fig. 5. This is a rather smaller percentage than the 65 per
cent reported by Piketty for France (2011, page 1097), but it is not too different. On the
other hand, there has been considerable variation in the coverage of the statistics over time.
This reflects both changes in the exemption level and changes in statistical practice. When
the modern Estate Duty was introduced by Harcourt in 1896, some 15 per cent of estates
were liable for tax. Since the threshold remained at £100 from 1896 to 1945, the proportion
rose steadily, reaching 40 per cent at the end of the Second World War. The threshold was
then increased sharply to £2,000, and, as a result, the proportion liable for tax fell to around
2 Although it should be noted that the national income figures used as a denominator relate to Great Britain
plus Northern Ireland.
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Fig. 5 Coverage of estate data and estate tax in Britain from 1896 to 2008
10 per cent.3 There was then a downward trend until the mid-1990s.4 On the other hand,
from 1960, the statistics cover all estates brought to the attention of the authorities, and this
gives a much larger proportion—between 40 and 50 per cent. The estates covered are those
that are dutiable and those where there is a grant of representation (grant of confirmation in
Scotland).5
There are therefore, in the period since 1960, around half the estates missing, referred
to here as the “excluded population” or “excluded estates.” What is their wealth? The tax
authorities (previously the Inland Revenue (IR), now HMRC) have in recent years sought to
reconcile the estimates of wealth obtained from by multiplying up the estate data with the
figures given in the national balance sheets (for example Table 13.3 on the HMRC website,
archive tables). For 2005, the estimated wealth of the excluded population was around a
quarter of the recorded wealth, but the greatest part of this was accounted for by property
held jointly (typically where a couple own a house jointly). Since we are not concerned
here with such “sideways transfers,” we have considered only the “small estates”, which are
some 2 per cent of the recorded wealth. The figures are linearly interpolated where there are
no IR/HMRC estimates.
3The sharp reduction in the number of estates covered is shown in Table 216 in 95th Inland Revenue Annual
Report (AR), where the number for Great Britain falls from 204,000 to 53,000.
4As is demonstrated by Hills and Glennerster (2013), the RPI-adjusted threshold varied around a constant
real level until the late 1980s and then began to rise (see their Figure 8.1). As they stress, the threshold
exhibited considerable variation relative to house prices, to which it became linked since October 2007. This
led to variation in the proportion of estates above the threshold - see Fig. 5.
5 The grant is the legal document that allows the executors or administrators to deal with a deceased person’s
estate.
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In order to go back to years before 1971 (the earliest IR estimate), we make use of the
estimates of the wealth of the excluded population made by Atkinson and Harrison (1978).
We link to the IR/HMRC series the central estimates for 1923 to 1972 of Atkinson and
Harrison (1978, Table VI.1, column B3), extended to 1981 in Atkinson et al. (1989).6 We
have adjusted the England and Wales estimates (for 1923 to 1938) to a Great Britain basis
by simply multiplying by the ratio of the Great Britain to England and Wales populations.
The Atkinson and Harrison estimates are not fully appropriate, as they include jointly held
property, although this was then smaller in value, since the rate of owner-occupation was
lower. The estimates have the advantage that they make provision for the “jump” in the
series between 1959 and 1960, allowing for the much larger proportion, some 90 per cent,
not covered between 1946 and 1959. The estimates were based on an exercise that involved
examining, by asset type, the implications of the higher level of exclusion. This procedure
was based on the work of earlier researchers such as Clay (1925), Campion (1939), and
Lydall and Tipping (1961). The calculations made here of the wealth of the excluded pop-
ulation for the period 1896 to 1922 follow the approach of Clay (1925) for 1912 and 1921.
The methods are described in the Appendix.
We have now to go from the wealth of the excluded population to the amount bequeathed
in any one year. This depends on the mortality amongst the excluded population, about
which we have no direct information. We have to apply the reverse of a mortality multi-
plier. For the present, a simple multiplier of 30 has been assumed to apply throughout the
period. The addition for non-filers is small in most years, but it does make a significant dif-
ference for the period from 1946 to 1959, when the data did not cover any estates below the
threshold. The corrected series gives a more accurate picture of the changes over time.
3.3 Under-valuation or exemption of certain classes of assets
The adjustments considered here concern (i) the possible under- or over- valuation of assets
transferred through inheritance, and (ii) the omission of assets through tax avoidance. No
account is taken of evasion. In 1967, Revell commented that “most people would probably
agree that [evasion] is at a low level in Britain—if only because the legal methods of avoid-
ance are so many” Revell (1967, page 112).7 Both valuation and omission are affected by
the changing forms of capital taxation, which impact on both behaviour and the statistical
recording. In what follows, reference is made to some of the relevant provisions, but no
attempt is made to follow all the changes that have taken place over more than a century.
There are several reasons why the valuation may depart from that needed here. The
Inland Revenue (HMRC) has identified these in their studies of total personal wealth and
their reconciliation of the wealth estimates obtained from estate data with the national bal-
ance sheets. As noted above, in some cases the adjustments do not apply here. For example,
they adjust life policies on the grounds that the estate data value the policies at the amount
paid on death, whereas in the hands of the living their value is less. Here we are interested
in the sum passed on, so that the estate valuation is correct.
6The gaps in the series from 1931 to 1935, 1937, and 1939–1941, are filled by linear interpolation. The gap
from 1946 to 1949 was filled by extrapolating backwards the 1950 figure on the basis of the change in the
total personal wealth series.
7 At the time of the introduction of the modern Estate Duty there was much discussion of the risk of increased
evasion. The fall in revenue that had been feared did not materialise, and the Inland Revenue noted in in its
Annual Report of 1895 that “the fears of evasion . . .were exaggerated” (38th AR, page 52).
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Certain of the adjustments for valuation that are relevant here affect specific classes of
asset. For example Inland Revenue research into estates below the threshold found that the
value of dwellings in such estates had been underestimated by some 15 per cent, leading
to an overall increase of some 10 per cent in the valuation of houses (Central Statistical
Office 1978, page 46). Or the adjustment may affect several asset classes. For example,
the valuation has been affected by the time lags between death and the appearance of the
estates in the statistics. Given a general tendency for asset prices to rise, this leads to an
under-statement. The Inland Revenue estimated that for the years 1965 to 1975, the average
under-statement was some 2.5 per cent (Central Statistical Office, 1978, page 43).8 The
official statistics switched to a “year of death basis” with effect from 1980 (see Inland
Revenue Statistics 1984, page 42).
The second type of adjustment is for property that does not have to be notified for pro-
bate. Under Estate Duty, in addition to small estates, and jointly-owned property passing
on death, this included most property held in discretionary trusts, accumulation and main-
tenance fund property, and property held in settlements on a surviving spouse (Dunn and
Hoffman 1983, page 39). Certain assets are not included in the estate because they are taxed
separately, for example the special provision introduced in 1909 whereby growing timber
is not taxed until it is sold. It should be noted that certain assets attract a lower rate of duty,
such as farm or business assets, but the full value is in principle recorded in the statistics.
The geographical coverage may lead to certain assets being excluded, such as immovable
property situated overseas until the Finance Act 1962, or incorrectly included, such as cer-
tain property belonging to persons domiciled in other countries. In addition, from 1896 until
1914, Settlement Estate Duty was in force. Settled property (property held on trusts) on
which duty had been once paid was not liable a second time and, as a result, a substantial
amount of settled property was missing from the estate statistics.
Faced with this variety of problems, it is not easy to estimate correction factors, but the
research undertaken by the Inland Revenue provides a valuable basis for the years since
1971. They have regularly supplied tables showing the different steps in going from the
multiplied-up net worth of the personal sector as identified on the basis of the estate data to
the balance sheet estimates. Here I have not taken the adjustments for life policies, pension
rights, consumer durables, or small estates (already included above), or joint property (for
the reason explained above). In terms of the adjustments listed in Central Statistical Office
(1978, page 42), I have taken adjustments 1 to 4 (later labelled “under-recording”) and 7
(“excluded trusts”). These adjustments have varied as a percentage of the total identified
wealth, but were around 15 per cent from the 1970s through to the early 1990s, when they
rose to around 25 per cent. It has to be recognised that the adjustments apply to estimated
wealth, and do not necessarily apply to estates. The allocation depends on the age/gender
mix (see Dunn and Hoffman (1983)). This means that any attribution is at best approximate.
Rather than using the figures for individual years, I therefore simply assume an adjustment
of 15 per cent from 1971 to 1995 and 25 per cent thereafter. For the excluded trusts, the
early Inland Revenue estimates were of the order of 5 per cent, but following the work of
Robson and Timmins (1988), they arrived at estimates which were “much lower than those
previously used, but are considered to be more accurate” (Inland Revenue Statistics 1988,
page 85). The revised estimates were some 1 per cent of identified wealth, and this figure
has been used throughout the period.
8Insofar as the adjustment is to an end of year basis, this is not appropriate for our purposes.
154 A. B. Atkinson
For earlier years, we have to turn to the limited estimates that have been made in the past.
It should be noted that the precise basis for these estimates is not always apparent. Campion
(1939, page 18) gives an estimate for 1911 of £51–£59 million for settled property passing
at death excluded from the estate duty returns, or some 20 per cent of total estates in that
year. The estimate of Campion for 1926–8 is much lower, as we would expect given the
ending in 1914 of the separate Settlement Estate Duty: £20-£30 million, or some 5 per cent.
In their estimates for 1954, Lydall and Tipping added to their total of £40 billion for personal
wealth a further £1 billion (2.5 per cent) for discretionary trusts (Lydall and Tipping 1961).
For 1961, Revell (1967, pages 137 and 138) estimated a much smaller £350 million (0.5
per cent of £78 billion), which is, interestingly, closer to the 1 per cent taken here for the
1970s. There are some reasons for supposing that the “under-recording” adjustment would
have been smaller in the past, given the lower rate of owner-occupation, and the lower rate
of asset price increase. In view of this, I have simply applied a 10 per cent adjustment for
both elements (under-valuation and exempt settled property) for the period 1915–1971, and
20 per cent for 1896–1914.
3.4 Gifts inter vivos
Gifts inter vivos are an obvious route to avoid death duties, and gifts made in a period prior
to death have for this reason been taxed under death duties. The gross amount of gifts began
to be reported in the Estate Duty statistics from 1897.9 The period covered was initially a
year, but was extended in 1910 to three years. The period for which gifts were subject to
duty was increased in 1946 to five years, and in 1968 to seven years. To further complicate
matters, the Finance Act 1960 provided that where gifts were made in the third, fourth and
fifth years before death, their value should be reduced for tax purposes by 15, 30 and 60 per
cent respectively. Estate Duty was replaced by Capital Transfer Tax (CTT) in 1975, which
extended the tax to all lifetime transfers (those made after 26 March 1974). This provision
was short-lived, being replaced by a ten year period, which was in effect from 27 July 1981
to 18 March 1986. The Finance Act 1986 introduced the current Inheritance Tax, replacing
CTT, levied on assets left at death and gifts made within seven years of death, with the
charge tapered depending on the period between the gift and death.
The incomplete taxation of gifts inter vivosmeans that the UK data on gifts are much less
complete than those in France, where in principle all of them are recorded. This seriously
limits the extent to which we can correct the estate figures for the missing gifts inter vivos.
At the same time, a number of attempts have been made, using different methods, to estimate
the extent of gifts inter vivos in the UK. The researchers have all recognised the considerable
limitations of the estimates, but they provide some basis for quantification.
The first attempt, to my knowledge, is that of Wedgwood (1929, 1939). He made use of
the fact that “voluntary dispositions” of certain classes of asset were taxable under the Stamp
Duties. This applied independently of the time when they were made, so in principle all gifts
in the relevant classes were covered. But the partial coverage and exemptions meant that
the estimate based on gifts paying Stamp Duty was a lower bound. As put by Wedgwood,
“we know what it must exceed, by referring to the figures of gifts taxed for Stamp Duty”
9Details are provided in Sandford (1971). He points out that the early figures were gross amounts but that
net amounts were also given from 1919 to 1930. From his Table B1, it may be seen that the net and gross
amounts are very close, and no distinction is drawn here.
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Fig. 6 Estimates of gifts inter vivos based on Stamp Duty in the United Kingdom from 1896 to 1985
Wedgwood (1929, 1939, page 245), but we do not know how much more is transferred
in exempt forms, which include British Government stocks, cash, bearer bonds, household
goods, and transfers below the Stamp Duty exemption limit.
The charge under Stamp Duty was introduced in the Finance Act 1910, and the data
therefore start in 1910. The charge on gifts was abolished with effect from 1985. The series
therefore covers a considerable part, but not all, of the period. The data have been used by
Whalley (1974), following the suggestions of Prest (1973), to make estimates for the period
1960 to 1961, and here I have used the full run of available years from 1910 to 1984—see
Fig. 6. Unfortunately, the data do not record the total transferred but the net receipt of duty.
It is therefore necessary to gross-up the recorded amounts. The procedure used here, as in
Whalley (1974), is to assume the “standard” rate of duty, which was 1 per cent at the outset,
but which has been 2 per cent in two periods. Grossing up by a factor of 100 or 50 does
however under-state the total, since there were reduced rates on smaller transfers. Some
check can be made from a second set of figures, published up to 1976, of the valuations
undertaken by the Valuation Office in relation to the Duty. These valuations however are
only made for certain classes of transfer, so that they would understate the total. The results
in Fig. 6 suggest that the valuation-based numbers move over time in a similar manner to
the grossed-up duty estimates, with the valuation numbers (usually) below the grossed-up
estimates. This is re-assuring. Finally, we should note that the estimates are of total gifts,
some of which would fall within the period for which they would be taxable (and hence
would already have been included). Whalley made corrections for the years 1960 to 1965
to subtract those gifts that were subsequently caught by Estate Duty (and therefore have
already been counted in the estate totals). Around a quarter were taxed under the 5 year
period, and around a third for the 7 year period. Overall, Whalley concluded that a minimum
of 10 per cent of wealth passes via gifts and that a minimum of 7 per cent avoided Estate
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Duty. He goes on to say that “one certainly cannot exclude the possibility of the stamp duty
statistics only capturing one-half of gifts actually made” (1974, page 642).
The second method uses the data on gifts “caught” by Estate Duty under the n-year rule,
for which gifts become taxable if death occurs within n years. This method was proposed
by Tait (1967, Appendix II), and applied in Atkinson (1972, page 127) to estimate that the
gifts avoiding Estate Duty in 1966 amounted to £350 million, adding around a fifth to the
total transferred. As was noted by Whalley (1974, page 642), such an estimate would be
consistent with the Stamp Duty approach if the latter were capturing only a half. We should
also note that Sandford, studying the development of the amount of gifts caught by the rule
from 1898, expressed as a percentage of the total estates, concluded that “there has clearly
been a secular upward trend in the amount of giving since the introduction of estate duty”
(1971, page 87). The same conclusion was drawn by Horsman (1975). For the period 1960
to 1971 he found “a growing tendency for wealth-holders to try to avoid duty by means of
gifts” (Horsman 1975, page 522). In Fig. 6, the Estate Duty-based figure shows the amount
of gifts caught by the n-year rule, expressed as a percentage of total estates. The effect of
the extension of n from 1 to 3 can be seen from the jump in 1910, and from 5 to 7 from
the rise after 1968. Unfortunately, the published Estate Duty statistics do not show the gifts
caught by Duty for the period 1931 to 1959.
The Estate Dutymethod multiplies up the total recorded gifts to allow for those where the
donor did not die within the specified period. The central objection to the calculations of Tait
and Atkinson, as noted by Sandford (1971, page 87n), is that they applied a single arbitrary
mortality multiplier to the estate totals. Horsman (1975) was able to use the Inland Revenue
multipliers appropriate for the relevant age/sex group. He found that the total gifts were
£413 million in 1967/8 and £396 million in 1968/9, implying overall mortality multipliers
of 9.9 and 8.7, respectively. They also represented 23.7 and 20.6 per cent of the total gross
value of estates in the two years. Horsman went on to estimate that the amounts of gifts
avoiding Duty were £352 million and £322 million (20.2 per cent and 16.8 per cent of total
gross estates).
The vertical scales in Fig. 6 are such that, if the gifts caught by Estate Duty were mul-
tiplied by 4, then they would be comparable with the scale for the gift estimates based on
Stamp Duty. If the latter are under-stated by a factor of 2, then the two sets of figures would
be broadly in agreement if the appropriate mortality multiplier were 8 (i.e. 4 x 2). This
would be close to those derived by Horsman. It should be noted that this takes no account
of the variations in the period for which gifts were subject to duty.
Taking the evidence from both these sources in the round, there seems therefore to be
grounds for adding to the estate totals a figure of around 15–20 per cent in the late 1960s.
This was indeed the conclusion of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and
Wealth: “the Inland Revenue statistics of estates may underestimate the amount of wealth
passing by as much as 15–20 per cent because of the omission of gifts falling outside the
7-year period” (1977, page 279). The time-path in Fig. 5 suggests that the adjustment in
the 1950s would be smaller—around 10 per cent—and more like 5 per cent before the
Second World War. The evidence for recent years is less easy to interpret, in view of the
changes in taxation. There is however a further source - sample surveys that have been
exploited in Karagiannaki (2011b). In particular, making use of the Attitudes to Inheritance
Survey, conducted in 2004, she estimates that aggregate gifts are about 10 per cent of total
inheritances. In view of these findings, I make the – approximate—adjustments for gifts
inter vivos not captured in the estate figures: 5 per cent addition prior to 1945, 10 per cent
from 1945 to 1959, 15 per cent for the 1960s and 1970s, and 10 per cent after 1979. It is
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however quite possible that the adjustment under-states the extent of gifts inter vivos. As is
noted by Karagiannaki and Hills, “none of the available data sources appears to capture the
whole picture” (2013, page 116).
4 A return of inheritance in Britain?
The end results of the calculations described in the previous section are given in Table 2,
which shows the aggregate wealth transmitted each year over the period 1896 to 2008. In
considering these results, it is important to bear in mind the number of assumptions made
in arriving at the estimates, and the qualifications that surround them. The figures over-state
the intergenerational transmission of wealth insofar as there are sideways transfers; they
under-state insofar as there are transfers that skip generations. The adjustments for under-
valuation, for exempt property and for gifts inter vivos are all very approximate. The extent
of gifts may well be under-stated.
The time-path of transmitted wealth is illustrated in Fig. 7. This demonstrates the major
importance of inheritance before the First World War, when the adjusted total represented
some 20 per cent when expressed relative to net national income. In the inter-war period,
the adjusted total was around 15 per cent, falling to some 10 per cent after the SecondWorld
War, and then falling further to reach 5 per cent in the late 1970s. The question posed in the
title of this section asks whether there has since been an upturn in inheritance. The answer
depends on the standard of comparison. From the evidence summarised in Fig. 7, the ratio
of bequests to national income has risen since 1977. The unadjusted ratio was 3.4 and rose
to 5.8 in 2006, falling back after the financial crisis to 5.4 in 2008. The adjusted figure
showed a rise from 4.8 in 1977 to 8.2 in 2006, a rise of more than 3 percentage points. On
the other hand, this increase was more or less in line with the increase in personal wealth,
so that Fig. 8 shows a downward trend until 1990, followed by a levelling-off. When people
deny that inheritance has returned, then they may well have in mind the fact that it has not
increased in relation to total wealth. In the US, for example, Wolff and Gittleman find “little
evidence of an inheritance “boom.” “[From 1989 to 2007] wealth transfers as a proportion
of current net worth fell sharply . . . by 10 percentage points” (2011, page 1).
The fact that bequests in the UK seem to have tracked personal wealth in recent decades
does not however undercut the importance of this development. The rise relative to national
income is what matters for the taxable capacity. At a marginal tax rate of a third, a rise
of 3 percentage points would add 1 percentage point of national income to potential tax
revenue, making a significant contribution to reducing the deficit. Moreover, as discussed
in Section 2, the rise in personal wealth reflects, in part, the fall in the net worth of the
public and corporate sectors, and this has implications for the distributional justice and for
the economy. In the case of company shares, it could be argued that these were in the past
under-valued. When a person passed on shares to their children, the underlying value of
these shares was in the past greater than the stock market valuation. We should have imputed
the net worth of the corporate sector to the holders of company shares. Seen in this light,
part of the fall in bequests in the early 1970s may have been due to falling stock prices, with
their counterpart in rising net worth of the corporate sector. To this extent, the answer may
be, not that inheritance has returned, but that it never really went away.
On the other hand, as argued by Piketty (2009, Data Appendix, page 34), no such adjust-
ment should be made where the fall in corporate net worth was simply a correction of an
earlier over-valuation. And this argument does not apply to the net worth of the public
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Table 2 Estates as percentage of net national income in Great Britain (United Kingdom since 1974), with
adjustments
Unadjusted
estates £ million
as % national
income
Corrected
for non-filers
as % national
income
Plus correction for
exempt assets and
undervaluation as
% national income
Plus gifts inter vivos
as % national income
1896 204.2 14.8 15.2 18.1 18.9
1897 235.7 16.5 16.9 20.2 21.0
1898 237.7 15.7 16.1 19.3 20.1
1899 280.0 17.6 18.0 21.5 22.3
1900 250.4 15.3 15.7 18.8 19.5
1901 276.3 17.1 17.6 21.0 21.8
1901 276.3 17.1 17.6 21.0 21.8
1902 259.4 15.9 16.3 19.5 20.3
1903 251.2 15.7 16.1 19.2 20.0
1904 252.9 15.9 16.4 19.5 20.3
1905 260.9 15.7 16.1 19.2 20.0
1906 286.0 16.2 16.6 19.9 20.7
1907 269.0 14.5 14.9 17.8 18.5
1908 258.5 14.6 15.1 18.0 18.7
1909 271.7 15.1 15.6 18.6 19.4
1910 258.0 13.8 14.2 17.0 17.6
1911 265.9 13.6 14.0 16.7 17.4
1912 266.7 13.0 13.4 16.0 16.6
1913 281.7 13.2 13.7 16.3 17.0
1914 292.6 13.6 14.0 16.7 17.4
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920 372.9 7.3 7.7 8.5 8.8
1921 402.0 9.5 9.9 10.8 11.3
1922 431.2 11.6 12.1 13.3 13.9
1923 441.9 12.5 13.0 14.3 14.9
1924 461.1 12.5 13.1 14.3 14.9
1925 456.4 11.5 12.0 13.2 13.8
1926 466.5 12.4 13.0 14.2 14.9
1927 511.1 12.8 13.4 14.6 15.3
1928 525.1 13.1 13.7 15.0 15.6
1929 538.4 13.0 13.6 14.9 15.5
1930 516.8 12.7 13.3 14.5 15.2
1931 467.4 12.8 13.4 14.7 15.3
1932 515.7 14.5 15.2 16.7 17.4
1933 524.0 14.4 15.0 16.5 17.2
1934 533.7 13.6 14.3 15.7 16.3
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Table 2 (continued)
Unadjusted
estates £ million
as % national
income
Corrected
for non-filers
as % national
income
Plus correction for
exempt assets and
undervaluation as
% national income
Plus gifts inter vivos
as % national income
1935 570.8 14.0 14.6 16.0 16.7
1936 592.0 13.7 14.4 15.7 16.4
1937 594.7 13.1 13.7 15.0 15.6
1938 553.6 11.6 12.2 13.4 14.0
1939 533.1 10.9 11.5 12.5 13.1
1940 537.8 9.7 10.3 11.2 11.7
1941 569.4 8.5 8.9 9.8 10.2
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946 656.5 8.0 9.6 10.4 11.2
1947 802.9 9.2 10.6 11.6 12.5
1948 807.9 8.4 9.7 10.5 11.4
1949 819.3 7.9 9.2 10.0 10.8
1950 807.5 7.5 8.7 9.4 10.2
1951 840.9 7.1 8.3 9.0 9.7
1952 747.7 5.4 6.5 7.0 7.6
1953 751.2 5.6 6.6 7.2 7.8
1954 849.5 5.9 7.0 7.6 8.1
1955 758.1 4.9 6.3 6.8 7.3
1956 768.2 4.6 6.0 6.5 7.0
1957 780.1 4.5 5.9 6.4 6.8
1958 881.2 4.8 6.3 6.8 7.3
1959 979.3 5.1 6.6 7.1 7.6
1960 1,244.5 5.9 6.3 6.9 7.8
1961 1,346.9 6.0 6.5 7.1 8.0
1962 1,429.7 6.1 6.6 7.2 8.1
1963 1,530.6 6.1 6.7 7.3 8.2
1964 1,531.1 5.7 6.0 6.6 7.4
1965 1,591.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 7.2
1966 1,661.1 5.4 5.8 6.3 7.2
1967 1,739.0 5.4 5.8 6.4 7.2
1968 1,923.2 5.6 6.0 6.6 7.4
1969 1,948.2 5.3 5.6 6.1 6.9
1970 1,967.8 4.9 5.2 5.7 6.4
1971 2,275.0 5.1 5.3 6.1 6.9
1972 2,743.5 5.4 5.8 6.6 7.4
1973 3,126.9 5.2 5.5 6.3 7.1
1974 2,996.5 4.5 4.8 5.5 6.2
160 A. B. Atkinson
Table 2 (continued)
Unadjusted
estates £ million
as % national
income
Corrected
for non-filers
as % national
income
Plus correction for
exempt assets and
undervaluation as
% national income
Plus gifts inter vivos
as % national income
1975 3,441.8 4.1 4.4 5.1 5.7
1976 3,910.4 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.6
1977 3,866.6 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.8
1978 4,823.6 3.7 4.0 4.6 5.2
1979 5,921.3 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.5
1980 6,883.6 4.0 4.2 4.9 5.3
1981 7,628.0 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.4
1982 8,210.8 4.0 4.1 4.8 5.2
1983 9,195.3 4.0 4.2 4.8 5.2
1984 10,371.6 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.8
1985 11,481.7 4.3 4.8 5.4 5.9
1986 12,783.4 4.4 5.0 5.7 6.2
1987 14,306.4 4.5 5.0 5.8 6.2
1988 17,320.1 4.9 5.4 6.1 6.6
1989 20,121.9 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.9
1990 18,580.7 4.4 4.8 5.6 6.0
1991 19,453.2 4.5 4.9 5.6 6.1
1992 19,511.2 4.3 4.7 5.4 5.8
1993 22,196.3 4.6 5.0 5.7 6.2
1994 21,758.5 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.6
1995
1996 25,215.3 4.4 4.7 5.9 6.3
1997 25,716.3 4.2 4.5 5.6 6.0
1998 29,619.7 4.5 4.8 5.9 6.4
1999 34,603.6 5.1 5.4 6.7 7.3
2000
2001 41,911.3 5.5 5.8 7.2 7.8
2002 44,685.0 5.5 5.8 7.2 7.8
2003 49,998.0 5.9 6.1 7.6 8.2
2004
2005 56,052.0 5.8 6.0 7.5 8.1
2006 59,444.0 5.8 6.1 7.6 8.2
2007 62,062.0 5.7 6.0 7.4 8.0
2008 61,416.0 5.4 5.4 6.8 7.4
sector, where privatisation changed the reality and not just the form of ownership. The gov-
ernment policy created individual property rights to what had previously been communal
wealth, and the transmission of private wealth increased on this account.
So far I have focused on the past three decades. From Fig. 7 we can see that there was
not just a simple U-shape. There was indeed a large fall from the 1930s to the 1970s: the
adjusted wealth-national income ratio was 17 in 1932 but 4.8 in 1977. But before that, there
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had been periods of fall (5 percentage points from 1899 to 1914) and rise (6 percentage
points from 1921 to 1932). One could say that in the UK we have to explain, not one U, but
two U-shapes.
The basic accounting equation used by Piketty (2011) is that the ratio of transmitted
wealth, Bt , to national income, Yt , is equal in year t to
Bt/Yt = byt = mtμ∗t Wt/Yt
where mt is the mortality rate, μ∗t is the ratio of the average wealth of decedents (corrected
for gifts inter vivos) relative to the average wealth of the living, and Wt denotes total per-
sonal wealth. Another way of expressing the relationship is that the ratio of transmitted
wealth to total personal wealth is equal to bwt = mtμ∗t . In the case of France, he observed
that “the historical decline in the mortality mt seems to have been (partially) compensated
by an increase in the μ∗t ratio. Consequently, the product of the two, that is the inheritance-
wealth ratio bwt = mtμ∗t , declined much less than the mortality rate. . . . This is the central
fact that needs to be explained” (Piketty 2011, page 1105).
Figure 9 shows the ratio byt for the UK. It may be seen that in the UK the mortality
rate (for persons aged 20 and over) was broadly constant from 1896 to the 1970s, whereas
the implied value of μ∗ rose in the 1920s and then fell until the end of the 1970s, when it
levelled off and began to rise in the 1990s. The situation described by Piketty, with mortality
declining andμ∗ rising, applied therefore to the most recent part of the upturn in inheritance.
From 1977 to 2006, the rise in the Bt/Yt ratio by a factor of 1.69 can be seen as the product
of 0.75 (mortality decline) 1.23 (rise in μ∗) and 1.83 (rise in Wt/Yt ). In contrast, the earlier
upturn, from 1921 to 1932 by a factor of 1.54 can be seen as the product of 1.06 (slight
mortality increase), 1.03 (virtually constant μ∗) and 1.41 (rise in Wt/Yt ).
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Fig. 7 Transmitted wealth in the United Kingdom between 1896 and 2008, as percentage of net national
income
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Fig. 8 Transmitted wealth in the United Kingdom from 1920 to 2008, as percentage of total personal wealth
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5 Comparison with France
This paper originated as a response to the challenge of Piketty (2011) who looked at the
overall wealth-income ratio for the UK (and the US), but not at the estate data. The conclu-
sion he drew about the UK, on the basis of admittedly piecemeal data, was that the private
wealth-national income ratio was 6.5 to 7.5 at the end of the nineteenth century, down to 3.5
to 4 in the 1950s–1970s, and up at 4.5 to 5.5 at the end of the twentieth century. Here I have
linked different series for the UK back to 1920. As may be seen from Fig. 10, the French
and UK series are remarkably close in the latter decades, showing a rise from 3 to 5 from
the end of the 1970s to the present. The figures were also close at the outbreak of the Sec-
ond World War, but in the intervening period were rather different. In France the rise in the
ratio started in the 1950s; in the UK, the fall was less steep in wartime but continued until
the mid-1970s. The inter-war period was also different. The ratios were close in 1920, but
then followed a different trajectory.
How do these similarities and differences play out in terms of inheritance? Figure 11
reproduces the estimates of Piketty for France (covering here only over the shorter—113
year—period for which we have UK estimates). It shows in particular the major contribution
of gifts inter vivos to the recent up-turn. The raw estate data display a rise in the bequest-
national income ratio from 1.4 per cent in 1950 to 3.7 per cent in 2006, whereas the adjusted
figure rises from 2.5 to 11 per cent. The rise from 1977 to 2006 is by a factor of 1.61
(unadjusted) and 2.39 (adjusted). The upward adjustment for gifts inter vivos in France is
over 80 per cent in the 2000s.
The contribution of gifts is one reason that the upturn is more marked in France than in
the UK—see Fig. 12, where transmitted wealth, adjusted for both countries, is shown as a
percentage of national income. In terms of the earlier decomposition, the rise in the Bt/Yt
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Fig. 11 Transmitted wealth in France as percentage of net national income from 1896 to 2005
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Fig. 12 Comparison of France and the United Kingdom: transmitted wealth as percentage of net national
income from 1896 to 2008
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Fig. 13 Comparison of France and the United Kingdom: transmitted wealth as percentage of personal wealth
from 1896 to 2008
ratio in France by a factor of 2.39 between 1977 and 2006 can be seen as the product of
0.79 (mortality decline), 1.75 (rise in μ∗), and 1.74 (rise in Wt/Yt ). The first is very similar
to the UK (0.75), and the third is quite close (1.83 in the UK). The difference is in μ∗ (1.23
in the UK). It is quite possible that the UK estimates have under-stated gifts. Such an under-
statement would also account for the differing directions of change in transmitted wealth
expressed as a percentage of total personal wealth—see Fig. 13.
The other striking difference is that there was a strong recovery in the UK after the First
World War, and less of a fall after the Second World War, which took the transmitted wealth
to a level that was higher than in France for a sustained period (leaving aside the war years
for which there are no UK data) from 1920 to the late 1970s. As a result, the weight of
accumulated transmitted wealth must have been higher in the UK.
Finally, it should be noted that in the UK, with its freedom of bequest, it is possible that
the estate figures include more sideways transfers than is the case in France, and to this
degree over-state the extent of inter-generational transmission.
6 Conclusions
Changes in the extent of aggregate inheritance can have major economic and social conse-
quences. A society where each year people can expect to receive in inheritance a sum of
around a fifth of total income is very different from one where the sum is around a fiftieth.
The repercussions are likely to be seen in the labour market, in investment opportunities,
and in the housing market. In the UK, the level of transmitted wealth has not reached the
12 per cent of income in France (in 2006); nor did it fall so low. Expressed as a percentage
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of national income, transmitted wealth fell to under 5 per cent in the 1970s and has risen to
around 8 per cent. The figure would be lower if all inter-spousal transfers were subtracted,
but would be higher if gifts inter vivos are under-stated.
The significance of an 8 per cent figure should not beminimised. In 2008/9 it was the same
percentage as that of private pensions and annuities in total gross household income.
In this context, we should note that the taxation of wealth transfers was in the
past a significant source of government revenue. If inheritance is returning, then we need to
look again at its role as a basis for taxation.As is shown in Fig. 14, until the SecondWorldWar
a UK citizen was, statistically, more likely to pay Estate Duty at death than to pay income
tax whilst living. This is far from the case today, and this underlies calls for a reformed
capital receipts tax, as proposed by the Mirrlees Review (2011), and by Atkinson (1972).
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Appendix: Data sources
1. Total national and personal income
The national income series is from Mitchell (1988, pages 828–830) up to 1980, then the
National Income Blue Books 1997, 2004 and 2010, Table 1.1.
2. Total personal wealth
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The personal wealth series is compiled by linking several different series, with defi-
nitions that are not necessarily identical. It works back from the HMRC series for total
marketable wealth, 1990–2005 from the HMRCwebsite, Table 13.4, 1984 to 1989 from IRS
2000, Table 13.4, 1981 to 1983 from IRS 1998, Table 13.4, 1979 to 1980 from IRS 1996,
Table 13.4, 1976 to 1978 from IRS 1992, Table 11.4, linked at 1976 to series 1948 to 1976
from Blake and Orszag (1999), Table 12 (not including pension wealth), linked at 1948 to
series 1920–1948 from Solomou and Weale (1997), Table 6 (net personal wealth including
durables). The series has been extrapolated beyond 2005 in line with household net worth
as given in the National Income Blue Book 2011, Table 10.10.
3. Mortality rates
The series for total deaths at age 20 and over is from the Annual Abstract of Statistics
(AAS) and its predecessor, the Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom (StA): 1911 to
1925 from StA 1911–1925, Table 21, where the deaths for the age group 15–19 has been
taken as half that for 15–24; 1926 to 1930 from StA 1913 and 1917–1930, Table 24, where
the deaths for the age group 15–19 has been taken as half that for 15–24; 1932 to 1941 from
AAS 1935–1946, Tables 20 and 21; 1942 to 1965 from AAS 1966, Tables 28–31; 1966 to
1978 from AAS 1981, Table 2.29; 1980 and 1981 from AAS 2002, Table 5.18, 1982–2002
from AAS 2004, Table 5.19. These figures relate to the calendar year.
4. Wealth of the excluded population 1896–1923
The method is similar to that used by Clay (1925) to make estimates for 1912 and
1921. His total is made up of household goods plus “working-class savings”. For household
goods, we have taken the 1921 figure of Clay and assumed a constant real value in
other years, applying the ONS composite consumer price index. For each of the sav-
ings categories, we have obtained comparable series for the totals of each type, using the
sources listed below. It should be noted that we have not included the funds of Friendly
Societies, Trade Unions, of the National Health Insurance Fund, nor the Unemployment
Insurance Fund, on the grounds that these do not form part of inheritance. This reduces
Clay’s UK total for 1912 from £546 million to £452 million. Clay adjusts his total by
a factor to allow for the part of these types of saving that are held by those covered
by the estate duty statistics. He adjusts by subtracting 14 per cent in 1912 and 21 per
cent in 1921. Here we have instead followed the estimates made by Radice (1939) of
the proportions attributable to the excluded population; see Atkinson and Harrison (1978,
pages 302–3).
The sources for specific categories are as follows:
a. Savings Banks deposits: Post Office
From Mitchell (1988), pages 671–2.
b. Savings Banks deposits: Trustee Ordinary Departments (railway not included)
From Mitchell (1988), pages 671–2.
c. Savings Banks deposits: Trustee Special Investment Departments
From Mitchell (1988), pages 671–2.
d. Government stock held by Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks
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From StA 1890–1904 (Cd 2622), Tables 88 and 89, StA 1899–1913 (Cd 7636), Tables 93
and 94, StA 1910–1924, Tables 88 and 89.
e. Building societies
From StA 1890–1904, Table 92, StA 1899–1913, Table 98, StA 1906–1920, Table 87, StA
1908–1922, Table 84 (Great Britain figures extrapolated), StA StA 1910–1924, Table 92,
figure for 1923 based on proportionate growth in share capital (change in form of table),
which agrees with increase in deposits shown in Radice (1939, Table VII).
f. Industrial co-operative societies
From StA 1890–1904, Table 93, StA 1899–1913, Table 99, StA 1908–22, Table 85, StA
1910–24, Table 93 (increase of 1923 over 1922 used to link to earlier series), where sum of
share capital and amounts due to depositors is used to link to 1912 and 1921 figures given
by Clay (a linear fit to these two numbers).
g. Registered Friendly societies (not included)
From Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the year ending 31 December
1899, page 36, for the year ending 31 December 1901, page 29, year ending 31 December
1901, page 25, year ending 31 December 1903, page 28, year ending 31 December 1904,
page 31. Year ending 31 December 1907, page 48, year ending 31 December 1908, page
44, year ending 31 December 1909, page 42, year ending 31 December 1910, page 37, year
ending 31 December 1911, page 41, year ending 31 December 1912, page 60, year ending
31 December 13, page 80, year ending 31 December 1917, page 93, figures for 1896–7,
1900, 1904–5, 1917–20, and 1922–3 interpolated linearly.
h. Industrial life assurance, life funds
Taken from StA 1890–1904, Table 94, StA 1899–1913, Table 100, then 1914 to 1923
from Report of the Industrial Assurance Commissioner for the year ended 31st December
1925, page 124 (industrial assurance companies, to match figure of Clay), figure for 1913
interpolated.
The resulting total for 1921 is £650 million, which, on the basis of Clay’s estimate of 13.5
million persons, amounts to some £48 per head. The estate duty threshold was then £100.
The Atkinson and Harrison (1978) central estimate for 1923 was £825 million, adjusted to
a Great Britain basis. As noted in the text, this included jointly held property that is not
covered in the estimate here.
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